Why Wasn't Kant a Phenomenologist?
One book that somebody should write, and I would read it with great interest and curiosity, would be "Why Wasn't Kant a Phenomenologist?" We almost got something like that in Heidegger's book, "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics," but I need someone to go further than Heidegger, to explain much that Heidegger leaves unexplained. Because I, for one, when I read Kant, cannot help but feel that he is tending towards phenomenology - and, of course, after Kant, phenomenologists sprouted up like mushrooms. To oversimplify matters entirely, the problem is essentially this: Kant seems to have recognized something like the antinomial character of metaphysics - therefore, he "should" have renounced metaphysics altogether and insisted on focusing simply on the phenomena themselves, refusing to allow any of the phenomena to acquire any metaphysical residue, so to speak. It almost seems inevitable that a philosopher, having confronted the Kantian antinomie...