Wittgenstein
If I were to sum up Wittgenstein in one word, it would be "repressive". Wittgenstein's thought is a project of intimidation. And generations of would-be philosophers have been made timid by his influence.
Contrary to popular belief, postmodernism is not a product of continental philosophy - it comes from the analytic tradition's assault on continental philosophy, epitomized by Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein, in his later thought, claims that language only works within specific language games, and that the attempt to use language abstractly, outside of such specific language games, constitutes a misuse of language. The answer to Wittgensteinism is simply to say, "Prove it." Of course Wittgenstein cannot - nor can anyone else - prove it, for as soon as they started, they would be engaging in precisely the kind of abstraction, outside of any specific language game, that they forbid. Any attempt at such an argument would be immediately self-defeating. So Wittgenstein does not even attempt to prove it - he merely states it, as a bald assertion, a kind of commandment.
To give credit where credit is due, Wittgenstein's non-argument - rather than an argument, it would be better to call it a hunch, a gut feeling, an aesthetic - is mostly right-headed. But not always. What Wittgenstein identified could not be called a fallacy, exactly, but an area where it is easy to make mistakes and where we should be most skeptical, most on our guard, where we should steel ourselves against the very strong possibility of being swindled. Rather than a logical fallacy, we could say that Wittgenstein identified a "problem area" - perhaps even a problematic? Of course as soon as someone leaves off speaking about a swing of this racquet in this particular game of tennis, and starts talking about "every swing," "all swings," "the swing-as-such," "the swing-in-itself," "the swing," "swing," etc., etc., we should narrow our eyes.
Where Wittgenstein errs is, ironically enough, precisely in attempting to universalize. It is true that, for instance, in the Platonic dialogues, and also, in a different way, in the writings of Augustine, and in yet another way, in the works of Hume and Kant, words are taken out of the context that gives them meaning, and then interrogated. (Hume's is/ought distinction is a perfect example of such a confusion.) Perhaps it is even sensible, in a limited sense, to attempt provisionally to "un-ask" such questions. But it does not follow from this that all of philosophy proceeds in the same way. It does not even follow in the cases of Plato, Augustine, Hume, and Kant, that their philosophy is rendered worthless thereby. We must remain agnostic about the wider applicability of Wittgenstein's skepticism.
The Wittgensteinian dictum to thought is: "Stay in your place!" But the limits of language - and the boundaries around each specific language game - are more porous than they first appear, and slippages of meaning between one domain and another are inevitable and often fruitful.
For some minds, Wittgenstein is the thorazine of philosophy, taking away the risk of delirium by removing our capacity for imagination. (Or, to put it in Freudian terms, which are always less interesting than their chemical cousins, Wittgenstein is the horrifying, emaciated, vampiric specter of a being that is all superego, without any ego or id.) That said, taking Wittgenstein in small doses is fine and even can be fun, so long as we don't take it too seriously.
When Wittgenstein says that ethics and aesthetics are one, he means that they are both outside his purview, which is true - for they are topics of philosophy, and he does not engage in philosophy, but merely in a speculative and unscientific linguistics. The doctrine that "The limits of language mean the limits of my world" is itself a violation of the very principle it is meant to embody. It is also simply wrong. Squirrels and babies have worlds, prior to the acquisition of any social language (if they do have language, it must be a "private language"), and much of me is closer to a squirrel or a baby than I am to an angel. Angels may be limited by the logos, but not I.
Now that it is becoming all too obvious that postmodernism was a dead-end for philosophy, it may be necessary to go back and unask the questions that Wittgenstein asked, which lead us here. Even more so, it is necessary to unstate the imperatives that Wittgenstein commanded.
Wittgenstein's dictum that "meaning is use." (Sure, whatever. But as there ever been anything as utterly useless as the work of Saul Kripke?)
Contrary to popular belief, postmodernism is not a product of continental philosophy - it comes from the analytic tradition's assault on continental philosophy, epitomized by Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein, in his later thought, claims that language only works within specific language games, and that the attempt to use language abstractly, outside of such specific language games, constitutes a misuse of language. The answer to Wittgensteinism is simply to say, "Prove it." Of course Wittgenstein cannot - nor can anyone else - prove it, for as soon as they started, they would be engaging in precisely the kind of abstraction, outside of any specific language game, that they forbid. Any attempt at such an argument would be immediately self-defeating. So Wittgenstein does not even attempt to prove it - he merely states it, as a bald assertion, a kind of commandment.
To give credit where credit is due, Wittgenstein's non-argument - rather than an argument, it would be better to call it a hunch, a gut feeling, an aesthetic - is mostly right-headed. But not always. What Wittgenstein identified could not be called a fallacy, exactly, but an area where it is easy to make mistakes and where we should be most skeptical, most on our guard, where we should steel ourselves against the very strong possibility of being swindled. Rather than a logical fallacy, we could say that Wittgenstein identified a "problem area" - perhaps even a problematic? Of course as soon as someone leaves off speaking about a swing of this racquet in this particular game of tennis, and starts talking about "every swing," "all swings," "the swing-as-such," "the swing-in-itself," "the swing," "swing," etc., etc., we should narrow our eyes.
Where Wittgenstein errs is, ironically enough, precisely in attempting to universalize. It is true that, for instance, in the Platonic dialogues, and also, in a different way, in the writings of Augustine, and in yet another way, in the works of Hume and Kant, words are taken out of the context that gives them meaning, and then interrogated. (Hume's is/ought distinction is a perfect example of such a confusion.) Perhaps it is even sensible, in a limited sense, to attempt provisionally to "un-ask" such questions. But it does not follow from this that all of philosophy proceeds in the same way. It does not even follow in the cases of Plato, Augustine, Hume, and Kant, that their philosophy is rendered worthless thereby. We must remain agnostic about the wider applicability of Wittgenstein's skepticism.
The Wittgensteinian dictum to thought is: "Stay in your place!" But the limits of language - and the boundaries around each specific language game - are more porous than they first appear, and slippages of meaning between one domain and another are inevitable and often fruitful.
For some minds, Wittgenstein is the thorazine of philosophy, taking away the risk of delirium by removing our capacity for imagination. (Or, to put it in Freudian terms, which are always less interesting than their chemical cousins, Wittgenstein is the horrifying, emaciated, vampiric specter of a being that is all superego, without any ego or id.) That said, taking Wittgenstein in small doses is fine and even can be fun, so long as we don't take it too seriously.
When Wittgenstein says that ethics and aesthetics are one, he means that they are both outside his purview, which is true - for they are topics of philosophy, and he does not engage in philosophy, but merely in a speculative and unscientific linguistics. The doctrine that "The limits of language mean the limits of my world" is itself a violation of the very principle it is meant to embody. It is also simply wrong. Squirrels and babies have worlds, prior to the acquisition of any social language (if they do have language, it must be a "private language"), and much of me is closer to a squirrel or a baby than I am to an angel. Angels may be limited by the logos, but not I.
Now that it is becoming all too obvious that postmodernism was a dead-end for philosophy, it may be necessary to go back and unask the questions that Wittgenstein asked, which lead us here. Even more so, it is necessary to unstate the imperatives that Wittgenstein commanded.
Wittgenstein's dictum that "meaning is use." (Sure, whatever. But as there ever been anything as utterly useless as the work of Saul Kripke?)
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