Utilitarianism is a form of deontology.

It is often said that deontology is "disguised utilitarianism." 

In fact, the opposite is true.

Utilitarianism is a form of deontology. 

In metaethics, a deontological system is one that is based on fundamental, axiomatic principles of duty, and which derive all of their moral rules from this set of axiomatic principles (or, in some cases this one principle).

A utilitarian moral framework is one that is based on a single, axiomatic principle.  The principles vary from one utilitarian system to another, but they usually take the form of something that can be restated like this:

"Act in such a way that maximizes the total pleasure for the greatest number of people,"

or 

"Act in such a way that minimizes the total suffering for the greatest number of people,"

or

"Act in such a way that fulfills the desires of the greatest number of people,"

or something along these lines.  Among the various possible ethical systems, utilitarian systems are some of the most strictly deontological, since every other precept can be derived from one of these types of fundamental axioms, and furthermore, these axioms are completely a priori.  There is no evidence - and no possible evidence - that could persuade a rational person that "Act in such a way that maximizes the total pleasure for the greatest number of people" is "true" - whatever that could mean.

Now, you might respond that if utilitarianism is deontological, then every moral system is deontological.  

I'm not sure that that's true.  

But it could be.  Let's take this possibility seriously.  Consider, for instance, the "command" theory of ethics.  Could it be stated in the form of a deontology?  What would be its fundamental axiom?  Perhaps:

"Act in such a way that will be pleasing to the omniscient God."  

I suppose one might argue that you can "derive" all of the principles of the command theory of ethics from this fundamental principle.  I think this might be stretching the definition of the word "derive".  It seems pretty dubious that one could rationally derive moral laws from this axiomatic principle: I cannot hope to know what will be pleasing to an omniscient God, since I, with my meager, finite mind, am not, in fact, omniscient.  So we're back to square one.  One might as well base a system on "...what will be pleasing to the Flarnigloon," without having any idea what a Flarnigloon might be.  Any assumption that one's actions will be pleasing to an omniscient being seem, on reflection, to be nothing but vain and foolish pride.  It might be added that this way of attempting to organizing command theory into a system of axioms and derived theorems might well be considered heretical from the standpoint of certain theologies, but that is a topic for another time.  (If anyone knows of any other way of organizing command theory into an axiom and a set of derived theorems, let me know.)

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